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Utah law is clear that directors and officers of a Utah corporation owe the 
corporation the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which includes the duty to act in good 
faith. See Utah Code § 16-1oa-840(1); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727, 730 
(Utah 1982). Utah law is also clear that a director or officer's use of material non-
public corporate information to benefit him or herself constitutes a breach of 
fiduciary duty. C & Y Corp. v. Gen. Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 54 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) ("The trial court was also correct in determining that breach of 
fiduciary duty encompasses situations in which corporate directors use 
confidential information to the corporation's detriment. . . . [The defendant 
directors] bear the burden of showing their good faith and fair dealing .... For 
instance, they must show ... they did not use confidential information to further 
their own interests .... ") (citations omitted); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park 
Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 385, 296 P. 231 (1931) ("[directors and officers] 
are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their position"). 
In this case, Rawcliffe1 alleges that the Directors and Officers knew the 
Company was about to release news that would drive up the price of USANA's 
stock, and the members of the Compensation Committee deliberately awarded 
the stock appreciation rights ("SSARs") to themselves and the other Directors 
1 All capitalized terms have the same meaning as ascribed in the Opening Brief of 
Appellant ("Opening Br."). 
and Officers just before disclosing the market-moving news. The Compensation 
Committee members thus took advantage of material non-public information to 
grant themselves and the other Directors and Officers SSARs with a lower 
exercise price-and hence more value-than if the information had been available 
to the market. The Directors and Officers therefore breached their fiduciary duty 
of loyalty and good faith by using "confidential information to further their own 
interests." C & Y Corp., 896 P.2d at 54 (citation omitted). Moreover, because 
Rawcliffe alleges that the Compensation Committee members deliberately 
spring-loaded the SSAR grants, they engaged in "willful misconduct" that is not 
protected by Utah's business judgment rule, upon which the Directors and 
Officers so heavily rely. See Utah Code§ 16-10a-840(4)(b) (directors and officers 
can be held liable for "gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intentional 
infliction of harm on the corporation or the shareholders"). 
The Directors and Officers tout the fact that the exercise price of the SSARs 
was equal to the trading price of USANA stock on the date the SSARs were 
granted, and they argue that the grants therefore complied with the strict letter of 
the Plan, but that fact cannot bear the weight the Directors and Officers put on it. 
This is not a breach of contract case alleging that the Directors and Officers 
breached the terms of the Plan. Rather, this is a case alleging that the Directors 
and Officers breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith by using their 
knowledge of material non-public information to manipulate the timing of equity 
awards and a news release for their own benefit. Courts in other jurisdictions 
-2-
have consistently held that such allegations state a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty despite the fact that defendants complied with the letter of the corporation's 
compensation plan. See, e.g., In re CytRx Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., C.A. 
No. 9864-VCL, Oral Argument, Defendants' Motions to Stay or Dismiss and the 
Court's Rulings (TRANSCRIPT) at 39:13-40:2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 8, 2015) (Opening 
Br. Addenda D) (denying motion to dismiss claim for breach of fiduciary duty by 
approving spring-loaded stock option grants) ; Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 
448-49 (Del. Ch. 2008) (same); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S'holder Litig., 
919 A.2d 563, 593 (Del. Ch. 2007) (same); Ausikaitis v. Kiani, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
661, 670, 679 (D. Del. 2013) (same). The District Court's holding to the contrary 
is fundamentally inconsistent with Utah law, and this Court should therefore 
reverse the District Court's ruling and remand this case for further proceedings. 
II. UTAH LAW DOES NOT PERMIT CORPORATE FIDUCIARIES 
TO USE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FOR THEIR OWN 
BENEFIT 
A. The Standard of Conduct Demanded of Directors and 
Officers of Utah Corporations 
Under Utah law, "directors and officers are required to carry out their 
corporate duties in good faith, with prudent care, and in the best interest of the 
corporation." McLaughlin v. Schenk, 2009 UT 64, ~16, 220 P. 3d 146 (citing 
Utah Code §16-10-a-840). This principle is well-established both in the Utah 
Revised Business Corporation Act and in Utah common law, including in the 
cases cited by the Directors and Officers. See Utah Code § 16-1oa-840(1) 
(directors and officers shall discharge their duties "(a) in good faith; (b) with the 
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances; and (c) in a manner the director or officer reasonably believes to 
be in the best interests of the corporation"); Glen Allen, 77 Utah at 384-85 
("'Directors and other officers must exercise the utmost good faith in all 
transactions touching their duties to the corporation and its property"' (quoting 4 
Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272)); Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 183, 192, 228 P. 906 
(1924) ("Directors of a corporation occupy a position of trust and confidence and 
are considered in the law as standing in a fiduciary relation toward the 
stockholders. . . . The directors of a corporation are not permitted to use their 
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests .... " (citations 
and quotations omitted)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 
1365 (D. Utah 1993) (cited by Directors and Officers in the Response Brief of 
Defendant-Appellees at 24 ("Resp. Br.")) ("Utah clearly recognizes the duty of 
loyalty."). As the Directors and Officers point out repeatedly in their Response 
Brief, Section 16-1oa-840 further provides that a director or officer is not liable to 
the corporation unless his or her breach or failure to perform his or duties 
"constitutes gross negligence, willful misconduct, or intentional infliction of harm 
on the corporation or the stockholders." Utah Code§ 16-1oa-840(4)(b). 
Contrary to the Directors' and Officers' contentions, however, Utah law 
does not give them carte blanche to use confidential corporate information to 
benefit themselves. In fact, Utah case law, both before and after the adoption of 
Section 16-1oa-840, makes clear that fiduciaries of Utah corporations are not 
permitted to use their knowledge of material non-public information for their 
own benefit. See Glen Allen, 77 Utah at 384-85 ('"All [directors' and officers'] 
acts must be for the benefit of the corporation and not for their own benefit .... 
They are not permitted to profit as individuals by virtue of their position."' 
(quoting 4 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 2272)); Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730 ("Directors 
and officers have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their corporation and its 
stockholders .... They are obligated to use their ingenuity, influence, and energy, 
and to employ all the resources of the corporation, to preserve and enhance the 
property and earning power of the corporation, even if the interests of the 
corporation are in conflict with their own personal interests."); Bingham Consol. 
Co. v. Groesbeck, 2004 UT App 434, ~22, 105 P.3d 365 (same); Elggren, 64 Utah 
at 194 ("[C]ourts have adopted and are strictly and rigidly enforcing a policy 
which minimizes the temptation of officers of corporations to prefer their own 
interests rather than those of the corporation and the stockholders."); Chapman 
v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 36, 47 P.2d 1054 (1935) (relied upon by 
Directors and Officers at Resp. Br. 25) ("it is the duty of the directors of the 
corporation to exercise their functions in good faith with a view to promoting the 
welfare of the corporation, and that if they sell or dispose of the corporate 
property with a view to gain personal advantage rather than for the purpose of 
enhancing the interests of the corporation, they are guilty of bad faith"); 
Resolution Trust Corp., 820 F. Supp. at 1365 (relied upon by Directors and 
Officers at Resp. Br. 24) (the duty of loyalty in Utah "requires a director, among 
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other things, to act in good faith and in the best interests of the corporation, and 
prohibits directors from engaging in self-dealing"). Furthermore, the Utah 
Revised Business Corporation Act specifically prohibits Utah corporations from 
limiting the liability of directors for "the amount of a financial benefit received by 
a director to which he is not entitled[.]" Utah Code§ 16-1oa-84i. 
Throughout their Response Brief, the Directors and Officers repeatedly 
state that the Complaint was properly dismissed because the Compensation 
Committee complied with the express terms of the Plan in setting the exercise 
price of the SSARs equal to the market price of USANA's stock on the day of the 
grants. The pertinent issue in this action, however, is not whether the Directors 
and Officers violated the terms of the Plan, but whether Rawcliffe adequately 
states a claim that the Directors and Officers breached their fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and good faith. Although the Directors and Officers complied with the 
terms of the Plan, that does not necessarily mean they acted in good faith. 
Indeed, as the Directors and Officers note, the Plan is silent with respect to the 
timing of equity awards vis-a-vis corporate announcements. See Resp. Br. at 20. 
Accordingly, to determine whether Rawcliffe has stated a claim upon which relief 
may be granted, the Court should look not to the Plan, but to Utah statutory and 
case law. 
Well established Utah law plainly holds that the duty of loyalty and good 
faith prohibits corporate fiduciaries from using confidential corporate 
information to benefit themselves. See, e.g., C & Y Corp., 896 P.2d at 54, Glen 
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Allen, 77 Utah at 382-83 (citing Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620 (8th Cir. 1903)); 
Elggren, 64 Utah at 192 (citation omitted). And this principle remains applicable 
regardless of the Directors' and Officers' compliance with the Plan. 
Consequently, even though the Plan did not explicitly preclude the Directors 
and Officers from taking advantage of the market price of USANA's stock when 
they had knowledge of market-moving information the market did not have, 
Utah law did prohibit them from using their knowledge to benefit themselves in 
any way, including by timing the SSAR grants and the news release to ensure the 
SSARs were priced just before the news caused the market price of USANA stock 
to jump up. The District Court, which focused principally, if not entirely, on the 
Directors' and Officers' compliance with the Plan, erred in dismissing Rawcliffe's 
claims, and this Court should reverse that erroneous decision. 
Indeed, none of the Utah cases upon which the Directors and Officers rely 
supports dismissal of Rawcliffe's claims. For example, in Resolution Trust Corp. 
(see Resp. Br. at 24), the federal district court held that "there exists no issue as 
to the breach of defendants' duty of loyalty" because, unlike in the instant action, 
the plaintiff "[did] not allege bad faith or self dealing." 820 F. Supp. at 1365. 
Moreover, immediately after the sentence the Directors and Officers cite in their 
Response Brief, the court in Resolution Trust Corp. went on to summarize the 
Utah business judgment rule, stating "[i]f ... directors, acting in goodfaith, 
and with reasonable care, skill, and diligence, nevertheless fall into a mistake, 
either of law or fact, they will not be held liable for the consequences of their 
actions." Id. at 1367 (emphasis added and citation omitted). In the case at bar 
Rawcliffe is not challenging a "mistake" by the Directors and Officers; rather, he 
is challenging their intentional use of non-public corporate information to benefit 
themselves, which is the antithesis of "acting in good faith" and adequately states 
a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
Contrary to the Directors' and Officers' suggestion, in Reedeker v. 
Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court did not hold that Section 
16-1oa-840 protects directors and officers unless "a plaintiff can make a 
heightened showing of fraudulent intent or utter indifference." Resp. Br. at 24. 
Rather, Reedeker merely quoted the language of Section 16-1oa-840 in a footnote 
and held that it did not apply to trustees of a condominium association. 
Reedeker, 952 P.2d at 583 & n.6. In so doing, the Reedeker court did not analyze 
the pleading requirements for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty in the corporate 
context nor did it hold that a plaintiff had to show "fraudulent intent or utter 
indifference" in any context. Resp. Br. at 24. 
B. Delaware Law Prohibiting Spring-Loading Is Consistent 
With Utah Law 
The Directors and Officers would have this Court believe that Delaware 
sets a higher bar for its directors and officers than Utah does, and while spring-
loading is prohibited in Delaware, Utah directors and officers are free to take 
advantage of material non-public information to grant themselves and their 
fellow insiders favorably priced equity awards whenever the opportunity presents 
itself. Resp. Br. at 6 (arguing Utah's business judgment rule is different from 
-8-
Delaware's business judgment rule); id. at 21 (same); id. at 27 (same); id. at 34-
35 (same). This argument is baseless because the fiduciary duties of Delaware 
officers and directors are functionally identical to those of their Utah 
counterparts. In both Delaware and Utah, directors and officers are required to 
act loyally, in good faith, and with due care. See In re Orchard Enters., Inc. 
S'holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 32-33 (Del. Ch. 2014); Utah Code§ 16-1oa-840(1). In 
Delaware directors cannot be exculpated from liability for "intentional 
misconduct," 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), and in Utah directors cannot be exculpated 
from liability for "willful misconduct." Utah Code§ 16-1oa-840(4)(b). Case law 
from both Delaware and Utah plainly holds that directors using confidential 
corporate information to benefit themselves is an "intentional" /"willful" act that 
is not in good faith. Glen Allen, 77 Utah at 384-85; Nicholson, 642 P.2d at 730; 
Bingham, 2004 UT App 434, ~22; Elggren, 64 Utah at 194; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 
593; Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2003) (citing Brophy v. 
Cities Service, Inc., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. 1949)). In light of the bodies of law in both 
states, there is no rational basis to conclude that Utah law should treat spring-
loading differently than Delaware law does.2 
2 While it is not binding authority, Delaware law is instructive because the 
Delaware Court of Chancery, renowned throughout the country for its expertise 
in corporate law, has dealt with allegations of spring-loading on numerous 
occasions. See CytRx Tr. at 28:30-42:14; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 438-50; Tyson, 919 
A.2d at 575-76, 591-93. In fact, just one day before Rawcliffe filed his Opening 
Brief, the Court of Chancery denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty claims in yet another spring-loading case. See 
Larkin v. O'Connor, C.A. No. 11338-CB, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the 
In support of their attempt to distinguish Utah law from Delaware law, the 
Directors and Officers cite Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, i-120 n.10, 
241 P.3d 357, for the proposition that "this Court has previously declined to 
follow Delaware law in certain cases as 'unhelpful because [it] do[es] not involve 
the interpretation of statutes similar' to the Revised Business Corporation Act." 
Resp. Br. at 36. Brewster is inapposite, however, because the instant case 
involves interpretation of fiduciary duties that are identical under both the Utah 
Revised Business Corporation Act and Delaware common law. The Directors and 
Officers further refer to "Utah's unique business judgment rule," id., but in the 
context of this case there is nothing "unique" about it. On the contrary, the 
business judgment rule does not protect directors' use of confidential corporate 
information to benefit themselves in either Delaware or Utah. 
III. THE INSTANT ACTION IS VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL TO THE 
DELAWARE SPRING-LOADING CASES AND SHOULD NOT 
BE DISMISSED 
The Directors and Officers disingenuously attempt to distinguish the facts 
of the instant action from those in Tyson and Weiss by misstating the facts of 
those cases. In reality, the instant action is substantially identical to those cases 
Court's Partial Ruling (TRANSCRIPT) at 69:10-16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 2016) 
(attached as Addendum A). In Larkin the Court of Chancery denied defendants' 
motion to dismiss plaintiffs breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment 
claims against the Compensation Committee members who granted the spring-
loaded options to themselves. Id. The court has not yet issued a decision on the 
motion to dismiss the remaining claims against the remaining defendants. Id. at 
73:10-74:9. 
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(as well as CytRx and Larkin), and therefore the holdings in those cases are 
instructive here. As in the instant case, in both Tyson and Weiss: 
• The company had a stockholder-approved equity compensation 
plan. (R. 10, 31-56); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 575, 593; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 
• The purpose of the plan was to align the interests of the directors 
and officers of the company with stockholders and incentivize 
continuing employment with the Company and strong performance. 
(R. 10, 31); Weiss, 948 A.2d at 438. 
• The plan required that grants be made at fair market value, which 
was defined in the plan as the trading price on the date the grant was 
made. (R. 11, 40); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 575 n.15 (under the terms of 
Tyson's stock incentive plan, "[t]he exercise price of an incentive 
stock option may not be less than the fair market value of the Class A 
Common Stock on the date of the grant") (emphasis in original); 
Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439 (under the terms of Linear's stockholder-
approved option plan, "the per Share exercise price shall be no less 
than 100% of the Fair Market Value per Share on the date of grant" 
with '"Fair Market Value' [ ] defined as the closing bid price for 
Linear's stock ... on the date the options are granted").3 
3 Not all equity compensation plans require this. For example, in the Desimone 
case upon which the Directors and Officers rely (Resp. Br. at 26), the plan 
-11-
• Plaintiffs alleged that equity awards were granted prior to the release 
of positive information that caused the company's stock price to go 
up. (R. 12-14); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 576; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 439, 443. 
• The grants had exercise prices equal to the trading price on the date 
of the grant, and therefore complied with the express terms of the 
plan. (R. 11, 13); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 576, 592-93; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 
439, 442. 
• The grants had various vesting schedules that provided for vesting 
over several years. Resp. Br. at 5; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 592 n.75; 
Weiss, 948 A.2d at 447. 
There is no meaningful difference between the facts of the instant case and 
those of the numerous Delaware cases in which courts have declined to dismiss 
claims based on allegations of spring-loading equity awards. See Tyson, 919 A.2d 
at 592-93; Weiss, 948 A.2d at 443; CytRx Tr. at 39:13-40:2, Larkin Tr. at 69:10-
expressly allowed for the granting of below-market equity awards. Desimone v. 
Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 944 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
-12-
16.4 Accordingly, this Court should reach the same result as those courts and 
reverse the District Court's dismissal of this action.s 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons and those set forth in his Opening Brief, 
Rawcliffe respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Amended 
Memorandum and the Final Judgment and remand this case to the District Court 
for further proceedings. 
4 The Directors' and Officers' contention that Rawcliffe "cherry-picked" the 
examples of spring-loading and bullet-dodging alleged in his Complaint, (Resp. 
Br. at 17), is patently false because the Complaint identifies each and every equity 
grant made by the Compensation Committee between the adoption of the Plan 
and the filing of the Complaint, every one of which was timed to take advantage 
of market-moving corporate information. 
s In their Response Brief the Directors and Officers have attempted to introduce 
numerous "facts" that purportedly occurred well after the Complaint was filed in 
August 2014, including some that purportedly occurred after the motion to 
dismiss was decided in March 2015. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 9 (USANA's sales for 
the year ending December 31, 2015); id. at 10 (retirement of Poelman and 
McClain in May 2016); id. at 16 (same); id. at 32 (same); id. at 14 (adoption and 
approval of new equity incentive plan in May 2015); id. at 20 (same); id. at 17 
(purportedly no SSARs granted in year 2015); id. at 17 n. 3 (disclosure regarding 
SEC investigation in August 2014 subsequent to filing of Complaint). These 
purported facts, some of which contradict USANA's public filings, have no place 
in this appeal and the Comt should disregard them in their entirety. 
-13-
DATED this 27th day of June 2016. 
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THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. 
MS. ORMEROD: Good afternoon, Your 
Honor. Eve Ormerod of Smith Katzenstein on behalf of 
plaintiff Timothy Larkin. With me at counsel table is 








THE COURT: Good afternoon. 
Mr. Aronstam. 
MR. ARONSTAM: Good afternoon, Your 
Honor. Brad Aronstam for Advaxis and the individual 
defendants. With me at counsel table, my co-counsel 
from Alston & Bird, John Jordak. Also with me from my 
firm, Mike Sirkin. With Your Honor's permission, 
13 mr. Jordak will be presenting the motion to dismiss on 




18 Mr. Jordak. 
19 
20 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. ARONSTAM: Thank you. 
THE COURT: The floor is yours, 
Good afternoon. 
MR. JORDAK: Good afternoon, Your 
21 Honor. As Brad said, my name is John Jordak from 
22 Alston & bird In Atlanta, and we represent the 
23 defendants in this action as well as the parallel 
24 litigation in Federal Court in New Jersey, where we 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
1 have a motion to dismiss and a motion to stay 
2 currently pending. 
We're here this afternoon on our 
4 
3 
4 motion to dismiss. And I won't go into a great deal 
5 of background about the company or the individual 
6 defendants, since I think that's laid out in our 
7 papers in some detail. What I'd like to do is just 
8 jump right into the issues before the Court on our 
9 motion. 
10 We contend that the decision of 
11 Advaxis' compensation committee to award options on 
12 March 30th to the board and certain members of 
13 management is protected by the business judgment rule, 
14 and as a result, the complaint fails to state a claim 
15 and should be dismissed. 
16 The business judgment rule applies for 
17 two reasons: First, the options awarded were ratified 
18 by the stockholders when they approved the 2015 plan 
19 at the May 2015 annual meeting; and, second, the 
20 complaint fails to meet the two-part test laid out by 
21 this Court in Tyson for overcoming the business 
22 judgment rule. 
So let me first, Your Honor, start by 23 
24 talking about ratification. The contingent grants 
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5 
1 which were awarded on March 30, 2015, were ratified by 
2 stockholders at the annual meeting on May 27, 2015. 
3 As an initial matter, Your Honor, two votes were not 
4 reqµired to approve both the 2015 plan and ratify the 
5 options given by the compensation committee under that 
6 plan. 
7 THE COURT: Well, maybe two votes 
8 weren't required, but how do I know that when 
9 stockholders approved the plan, that they were 
10 specifically approving the particular grants? 
11 MR. JORDAK: Let me read precisely 
12 from the 2015 proxy language because I think that's 
13 important here, and I think that that answers Your 
14 Honor's question. 
15 THE COURT: You can. I have read it 
16 rather carefully. 
17 MR. JORDAK: Okay. "On March 30, 
18 2015, the Compensation Committee approved contingent 
19 grants of stock options to certain individuals, 
20 including executive officers and non-employee 
21 directors, subject to stockholder approval of the 2015 
22 Plan at the Annual Meeting. If stockholders approve 
23 the 2015 Plan, these contingent grants will be 
24 effective and will remain outstanding pursuant to 
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1 their terms. If stockholders do not approve the 2015 
2 Plan, these contingent grants will be cancelled and 
3 forfeited." 
4 So we believe that it could not have 
5 been more clear what the stockholders were 
6 
7 
specifically being asked to approve. They were 
provided with all the material information. They knew 
8 the exact number of shares that had been awarded in 
9 the provisional grants, they knew who the recipients 
10 were, they knew the exercise price, and they 
11 understood the minimum vesting requirements. 
12 THE COURT: Here's the issue. I'm 




the Calma opinion. Right? 
MR. JORDAK: Yes. 
THE COURT: And, obviously, I spent a 
17 fair amount of time looking at cases in this area. 
18 Let's assume, for sake of discussion, 
19 that ratification requires some meeting of the minds, 





If I read that -- or I did read that 
I mean, there would seem to be a pretty 
23 clear meeting of the minds that if you approve -- if 
24 you vote in favor of this, this plan is approved. But 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
7 
1 why does that necessarily mean there was a meeting of 
2 the minds on a different question about, We approve 
3 these specific grants? 
4 MR. JORDAK: I think, Your Honor, 
5 because the language that was included in the proxy 
6 goes through in great detail exactly what the 
7 shareholders were being asked to approve. So they 
8 were being asked to approve the 2015 plan, which gave 
9 the compensation committee the ability to award 
10 options; and at the same time, they were being asked 
11 to ratify what the compensation committee had done 
12 pursuant to that discretion with respect to awarding 
13 these options. 
14 THE COURT: All right. As a matter of 
15 logic, though, would you agree there could be a 
16 scenario where the collective group of stockholders 
17 did intend to approve the plan but did not intend to 
18 approve the specific awards? 
19 MR. JORDAK: I suppose that that could 
20 happen, Your Honor, but given that the 2015 plan 
21 specifically gives the compensation committee the 
22 discretion to award these options, it would seem a 
23 little incongruous for a stockholder to approve the 
24 plan which gives the compensation committee that 
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1 discretion but then not approve what the compensation 
2 committee actually did to exercise that discretion. 
THE COURT: Let me also take the flip 3 
4 
5 
side. Let's assume the vote went negative. Would you 
agree with me that a negative vote could mean, you 
6 know, one of -- I can think of three things: people 
7 didn't like the plan, people didn't like the specific 













Yes. That could happen, 
Okay. 
And a no vote would 
All right. 
I believe the Steiner 
16 case that we cited in our papers is very instructive 
17 here, Your Honor . There, the Court held that 
18 stockholder approval of an option plan that set forth 
19 specific awards effectively ratified the subsequent 
20 awards specified therein. 
21 And as Your Honor stated in the Calma 
22 case, when you were citing the Steiner case, you said 
23 the plan approved by stockholders in Steiner was, "in 
24 effect, self-executing: it set forth the specific 




awards to be granted II "In other words, 
stockholder approval of the plan per force meant 
stockholder approval of the option awards for which 
4 the directors asserted a ratification defense." 
5 
6 
And I think, here, we have a very 
similar situation. Approval of the 2015 plan and 
7 approval of the March 2015 grants were inextricably 
8 intertwined, and so approval of the 2015 plan per 




THE COURT: Remind me. It's just not 
in front of my forehead right now. What exactly about 
12 option grants of directors did that plan provide? 





MR. JORDAK: It did, Your Honor. 
had a specific number in the plan. 
did, Your Honor. 
In Steiner, it 
It 
THE COURT: Owe an annual basis, if I 




MR. JORDAK: It did. It did. 
Let me address just a few of the 
plaintiffs' arguments on ratification. The plaint i ffs 
22 rely on the Santa Fe case, which we would do not 
23 
24 
believe is applicable here at all. There, a 
stockholder voted. The vote to approve a merger at 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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1 issue did not constitute ratification of the board's 
2 unilateral decision to erect defensive measures 
3 against the bidder's offer because those defensive 
4 measures had already worked their effect before the 
5 stockholders had a chance to vote. That's not at all 
6 what we have here. 
7 And another of the plaintiffs' cases, 
8 the Calma case, Your Honor's case, that simply holds 
9 that stockholder ratification occurs when a majority 
10 of informed, uncoerced, and disinterested stockholders 
11 vote in favor of a specific decision of the board. 
12 Again, just like what we have here. 
13 The plaintiffs also cite the Gantler 
14 case, really, for the unremarkable proposition that 
15 the only conduct that can be ratified is that which 
16 the shareholders are specifically asked to approve, 
17 which, again, based on what we have in the 2015 proxy, 
18 is exactly what happened here. 
19 And then, finally, in Your Honor's 
20 case in Cambridge, which the plaintiffs rely on, 
21 there, the Court held that equity awards to outside 
22 directors are protected by the business judgment rule 
23 because each award was approved by a disinterested 
24 majority of the stockholders. The Court focused on 
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11 
1 what was disclosed, which was basically the same 
2 information as we have here, and not whether separate 
3 votes were required. 
4 THE COURT: Actually, again, it's been 
5 a little while since I read it, but -- I could be 
6 misremembering this but, first of all, I don't think 

















In Cambridge, Your Honor? 
Yes. 
Yes. There were separate 
that. 
And I think even separate 
14 votes like by person, if I remember correctly. 
15 MR. JORDAK: They were. But that 
16 decision, which the plaintiffs have argued applies 
17 here, that there necessarily must be separate votes, 
18 that is not an issue that the Court really addressed 
19 in the Cambridge case. 
20 
21 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JORDAK: So as the Delaware 
22 Supreme Court held in the Michelson versus Duncan 
23 case, Your Honor, ratification is valid if 
24 stockholders so ratifying are adequately informed of 
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1 the consequences of their acts and the reason 
2 therefor. So we contend that there's been 
3 ratification here and that the business judgment rule 
4 applies. 
5 However, Your Honor, because the 
6 complaint fails to meet the two-part test laid out by 
7 this Court in Tyson, which is required to overcome the 
8 business judgment rule in a spring-loading case, waste 
9 becomes the operative standard. And the burden, of 
10 course, is on the plaintiff to allege facts that no 
11 person of ordinary sound business judgment would say 
12 the consideration for the options was fair. And we 
13 contend that the plaintiffs have not met that standard 
14 here. 
15 I'd like to now walk through the 
16 two-part Tyson test which the plaintiffs must plead in 
17 order to overcome the business judgment rule. 
18 THE COURT: One thing I'm interested 
19 to hear is how you conceptualize these two different 
20 arguments interrelate, if you contend they do. So, 
21 for example, what we've been discussing up to now is 
22 your argument of the defense to a transaction that 
23 otherwise would be viewed as self-dealing and governed 
24 by entire fairness because the three members of the 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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1 compensation committee were approving grants to 
2 themselves and, for that matter, to their fellow 
3 directors, which presumably would be equivalent 
4 guess there was one guy that got 70,000 instead of 
5 20,000. 
I 
6 Now you're going into an area, though, 
7 where you're not necessarily just talking about them 
8 approving their own options. You're talking about 
9 
10 
some of the officers. And I'm just not sure how these 
two arguments are supposed to work together. If you 
11 could explain that to me, that would be helpful. 
12 MR. JORDAK: Sure. 
13 The first part of the argument with 
14 respect to ratification establishes if the 
15 stockholders approve the plan and approve the 
16 contingent grants, then the operative standard here is 
17 waste. The business judgment rule applies. In order 
18 for the plaintiffs to get out from underneath the 
19 business judgment rule that we contend applies, they 
20 would have to meet the two-part standard in Tyson. 
21 
22 
So we start with ratification. The 
business judgment rule applies. Then we move on to 
23 the Tyson analysis, which is what the plaintiffs have 
24 alleged is the operative --




THE COURT: Before you go down that 
road, then, what if you lose in the first part? Where 
3 does the second part fit in, the Tyson analysis? 
MR. JORDAK: If we lose on the first 4 
5 part, then we're under the entire fairness standard, 
6 Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right. For 
8 everything? 
9 MR. JORDAK: It is. And so the Tyson 
10 test wouldn't really apply because the business 
11 judgment rule is not applicable. 
12 
13 
14 Tyson test. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. JORDAK: So let me talk about the 
It's a two-part test. The first part is 
15 that the compensation committee had to be in 
16 possession of material nonpublic information at the 
17 time it issued the options, in other words, they knew, 
18 and the compensation committee had to intend to 
19 violate the spirit of the 2015 plan by issuing the 
20 options in advance of good news that would make the 
21 stock price rise. In other words, they violated the 
22 terms of the plan by issuing what are really below the 
23 market price on the day they're issued. 
24 After the compensation committee 
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1 awarded the contingent options on March 30th, the 
2 complaint alleges that three press releases were 
3 issued by the company in April 2015 about various 
15 
4 developments regarding Advaxis' drugs and presentation 
5 of its research regarding the same. 
6 In order to meet prong one of the 
7 Tyson test, the complaint must contain well-pled 
8 allegations that the compensation committee knew about 
9 the content of these press releases at the time it 
10 issued the contingent options on March 30th. And we 





done that. The complaint pleads nothing but 
conclusions about what the compensation committee 
would or should have known with 20/20 hindsight. 
Repeatedly uses phrases in the 
16 opposition such as "naturally would have expected," 
17 "would have known," "would have been keenly aware," 
18 
19 
"would have been aware." The complaint, in our view, 
asks the reader to take unreasonable inference after 
20 unreasonable inference, focuses solely on the titles 
21 of the defendants and the contents of what's in the 
22 press releases. 
23 We contend, Your Honor, that the 
24 allegations of what we have here are similar to what 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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1 the Court faced in the Desimone case where the Court 
2 held that those were inadequate under prong one of the 
3 Tyson test. 
4 We walked through a little bit of 
5 Desimone because I think that's useful to compare to 
6 what we've got here. So in Desimone, the plaintiff 
7 alleged that the board granted options to directors 
8 and officers 16 days before the corporation announced 
9 positive news that it secured a top position in the 
10 European market. 
11 The Court dismissed the action and 
12 stated that the complaint simply did not allege that 
13 any director was aware of the positive information at 
14 the time the grants were made and refused to draw such 
15 an inference from facts that were pled, given that the 
16 positive information was not released until more than 
17 two weeks after the grants, the information announced 
18 in the weeks after the options were granted lacked 
19 materiality, and -- this is an important quote -- were 
20 not of the type that was certain to send the 
21 corporation's stock price soaring. 
22 THE COURT: Now, the part of the 
23 opinion you're now quoting from and you're relying on, 
24 was that governed by Rule 23.1 or 12(b} (6)? 






So recognizing that 
3 there's a lower standard here, how do you address 
4 that? 
5 MR. JORDAK: Right. We understand 
17 
6 that the 12 (b) (6) standard is less than 23 .1, but even 
7 under 12(b) (6) jurisprudence, the plaintiffs have to 
8 plead more than just conclusions and recite the 
9 elements of the claim. 
10 The Court in Desimone found that even 
11 if the announcement caused a belated short-term spike 
12 in the stock price, that given the price swings to 
13 which the corporation's stock was susceptible, the 
14 announcement would not have been likely to have had a 
15 substantial effect on the stock's trading when the 
16 first of the options vested, much less on the bulk of 




And then finally in Desimone, before I 
20 move into how those compare to what we've got here, 
21 the complaint -- the Court criticized the complaint 
22 for failing to provide any information about how the 
23 company's stock performed on a market-adjusted basis. 
24 And so this left the Court with no idea of whether the 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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1 company's swings were correlated with overall market 
2 swings or whether they were correlated to actual 
3 statements and press releases put out by the company. 
4 And here, Your Honor, we have very 
5 similar allegations, as we've laid out in our papers. 
6 Extreme volatility in the price of Advaxis stock and a 
7 three-year vesting of the options. We believe these 
8 severely undercut any inference of materiality about 
9 the April 2015 announcements. 
10 
11 volatility. 
Let me talk first a little bit about 
There have been several one- or two-day 
12 periods in which the stock prices fluctuated more than 
13 10 percent since April 1, 2015. That would be on 
14 April 15th, April 30th, and September 21st, which are 
15 all laid out in Exhibit B to our motion to dismiss, 
16 which goes through all the stock prices during the 
17 relevant time period. 
18 And if we look again 
19 THE COURT: I'm sorry. What is that 
20 relevant time period? 
21 MR. JORDAK: The relevant time period 
22 would be from March through I guess through the end of 
23 April. 
24 THE COURT: Of 2015? 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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1 MR. JORDAK: I'm sorry. The options 
2 were issued at the end of March of 2015 and the 
3 shareholders approved them at the end of May. 
4 THE COURT: Right. But what I'm 
5 trying to understand is -- there is a separate issue 
6 of what I can look at outside the complaint, and I 
7 know you've put in some stock price activity. What I 
8 thought you were trying to drive at is that based on 
9 volatility prior to these grant issuances, and if 
10 there indeed was a lot of volatility, it would go to 
11 negating an inference that basically this was being 
·12 done with the intent to capture value based on the 
13 materially positive development they knew about at the 







So did you put in data predating 
Just remind me. 
MR. JORDAK: I'm not sure. I'd have 
to look at Exhibit B. We put in our stock chart. 
THE COURT: The volatility information 
20 sort of ex post, if you will, after the fact, would --
21 MR. JORDAK: Yes, but we also put in 
22 the volatility, as Your Honor alluded to just a minute 
23 ago, from March. I'm sorry. From January and 
2 4 February. 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. All right. So let 
2 me just ask you, so I have it, to the extent that 
3 there's some stock information here, like, after 
March 30th -- that was the grant date. Right? 
MR. JORDAK: It is. 




7 MR. JORDAK: I think after March 30th, 
8 the plaintiffs claim that the stock price going up 
9 after the date that the options were issued allegedly 
10 shows that we spring-loaded the options. 
11 And the point that I think I'm trying 
12 to make is that this, if anything, is not a stable 
13 stock. This stock jumps up and down, up and down. It 




months and weeks after March 30th. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JORDAK: So it would be very 
18 difficult for anybody on the comp committee to predict 
19 what the stock price is going to do in reaction to a 
20 press release, even assuming they knew the contents of 
21 the press release, or even earlier. It would be very 
22 difficult for them to predict what the effect on the 
23 market is going to be. 
24 And I think we laid out several 
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1 examples in our papers. For instance, I think I 
2 showed that the stock traded at 13.51 in January, and 
3 then it was down to 7.44 later in January, and then it 
4 dipped down to 7.02 in February. So the stock really 
5 has just jumped up and down. 
6 I think there is another exhibit in 
7 our papers that shows that in terms of a graph. 
8 That's Exhibit C where you can just see the up and 
9 down movement of the stock price. 
10 The other important point I'd like to 
11 make, Your Honor, is that between the date that the 
12 stock options were granted on a contingent basis in 
13 March and the date of that first press release in 
14 April, the stock price had already risen 20 percent, 
15 on no news at all. 
16 So for the plaintiffs to claim that 
17 somehow we were spring-loading these options, that we 
18 knew information back in the end of March when we 
19 granted the options, the story just doesn't really 
2 0 hang together. 
21 Additionally, Your Honor, the 
22 three-year vesting applicable to a majority of the 
23 options would require that the information in the 
24 April 15th releases be so material as to sustain an 
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1 increase in the company's stock price for 36 months. 
2 And, again, as I've just discussed, the ups and downs 
3 of this stock price would make that almost impossible. 
4 And then, finally, as the Court 
5 observed in Desimone, the complaint alleges nothing 
6 with respect to how the company's stock performed on a 
7 market-adjusted basis. And, in fact, the NASDAQ 
8 indices rose between April 7th and April 10th and 
9 between April 20th and April 27th. 
10 The plaintiffs rely on the Tyson case. 
11 However, the allegations in there were far, far 
12 different than what we've got here. In Tyson, you've 
13 got the sale of a division, you've got the canceling 





company's earnings beating estimates. Far, far 
different from the three April announcements that 
we've got here. 
And just to remind the Court, with 
19 respect to the three April announcements, those were 
20 the collaboration with a trial operator, enrollment in 
21 a Phase 1/2 clinical trial, and the interim results of 
22 a preclinical study. Very, very different from what 
23 was alleged in Tyson. 
24 So moving on to prong two of the Tyson 
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1 test which the plaintiffs must meet to overcome the 
2 business judgment rule, the complaint must contain 
3 well-pled allegations that the compensation committee 
4 intended to violate the spirit of the 2015 plan by 
5 issuing options in advance of good news that would 
6 make the stock price rise. And as with the first 
7 prong, we contend that the complaint has not met the 
8 second prong. 
9 I think that the hypothetical, and we 
10 quoted this in our papers, given by Vice Chancellor 
11 
12 
Strine in the Desimone case is very useful. Let me 
just read that. "Assume the stock option plan 
13 approved by the stockholders expressly required grants 
14 to be made at fair market value In fact, the 
15 disclosures to the stockholders in advance of the 
16 approval vote made clear that the stock option plan 




corporation to reward outstanding performance and to 
create incentives for superior future efforts. 
the carefully-crafted test articulated by the 
Under 
21 Chancellor in Tyson, these facts would arguably not 
22 give rise to anything other than an excess 
23 compensation claim, as it would be difficult to find 
24 that the defendants acted in a deceptive manner 
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1 intended to circumvent the purposes of a 
2 stockholder-approved stock option plan." 
3 So here, Your Honor, the plan has a 
4 dual purpose, just like in that hypothetical in 
5 Desimone, to compensate and incentivize/attract new 
6 talent. We also have a three-year vesting schedule, 




circumvent the plan. The board's grants did not vest 
immediately. They were under a three-year vesting 
schedule. Only one-quarter of the officers' options 
11 vested immediately, and those were from a prior plan 
12 No one has exercised any options, and so there is no 
13 $13 million in secret profits, as the plaintiffs 
14 claim. And the stock price is trading below the 
15 strike price now and has been for many, many months. 
16 The market has reacted erratically to 
17 previous announcements, and there was no way for the 
18 compensation committee on March 30th to predict how it 
19 would react in the coming weeks. We cited that on 
20 March 16, 2015, the company put out a press release 
21 about preliminary data from a Phase 1/2 clinical study 
22 of one of its cancer treatments. The stock price 
23 opened at 13.48, closed down at 13.01, and closed down 
24 further the next day at 12.41. 
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1 Similarly, on March 19, 2015, the 
2 company put out a press release announcing that the 
3 first patient had been dosed in a Phase 1/2 clinical 
4 trial evaluating one of the company's immunotherapies. 
5 The stock price opened at 11.90, closed at just 12.40, 
6 and closed down the following day, trading as low as 
7 11.82. 
8 And even in the opposition, the 
9 plaintiff admits, and I'm quoting here, "Here, the 
10 defendants could not have known about future movement 
11 of the company's stock." So it's simply unreasonable 
12 to infer any intent here. 
13 Again, the cases the plaintiffs cite, 
14 the Weiss case, the Tyson case, very, very different 
15 facts alleged. The Weiss case, you had 22 separate 
16 option grants over a ten-year period that were granted 
17 shortly before earnings were going to be announced. 
18 And in the Tyson case, as I said before, the comp 
19 committee had a four-year practice of granting options 
20 just days before material announcements, such as the 
21 sale of a division, the cancellation of a deal to buy 
22 a competitor, and earnings releases. 
23 So, in sum, Your Honor, the complaint 
24 fails to meet either prong of the Tyson test, and we 
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1 contend that the business judgment rule continues to 
2 apply to the comp committee's decision to issue the 
3 March 2015 options. 
4 
5 defendants. 
Let me move on to the recipient 
The plaintiffs have a claim against the 
6 recipient defendants that they breached their 
7 fiduciary duty by accepting the grants. 
THE COURT: Let's just see if, 8 
9 definitionally, I'm thinking of the same thing. When 
10 you use the term "recipient defendants" right now, how 






They are -- I'll tell 




four officers who are not directors. Is that right? 
MR. JORDAK: It does. 
So it includes Ms. Bonstein, who is 
18 the CFO; Dr. Khleif; Dr. Mauro; Greg Mayes, who is the 
19 COO; Dr. McKearn; Dan O'Connor, who is the CEO; 
20 Dr. Patton; and Dr. Petit, who is the EVP and the 
21 chief scientific officer. Those are the recipient 
22 defendants. 
23 THE COURT: All right. So the 
24 universe is the four directors who were not on the 
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1 comp committee, one of whom is an insider, O'Connor, 
2 
3 
plus the four nondirector officers. Is that right? 
MR. JORDAK: I believe that's right, 
4 yes. 
5 THE COURT: All right. 
6 MR. JORDAK: So we contend that the 
7 recipient defendants did not breach any fiduciary duty 
8 by accepting the grants. 
9 
10 because 
First, there can be no breach 
based on the acceptance, since, as we have 
11 already demonstrated, the options were properly 
12 granted and ratified. Furthermore, the recipient 
13 defendants did not know that the options violated the 
14 2015 plan. 
15 As the plaintiffs have done throughout 
16 the complaint, they only allege corporate positions, 








knowledge, which just isn't enough. And we've cited 
several cases in our brief that have held that. You 
can't simply say because somebody holds a position or 
sits on a committee without anything else that they're 
presumed to have knowledge. 
Again, the plaintiffs cite the Weiss 
case. We contend the facts there are very different. 
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1 And the Pfeiffer case, where the options grant 
2 
3 
exceeded the caps in a single year. Those cases dealt 
with very, very different factual situations. So we 
4 contend that the recipient defendants did not breach 
5 any fiduciary duty by accepting the grants. 
6 And then, finally, the last part of 
7 Count I is the nonemployee directors did not breach 
8 any fiduciary duties of loyalty by granting excessive 
9 compensation. First, we start with the business 
10 judgment rule protects the nonemployee direct6rs' 
11 decisions. If the 2015 plan has meaningful limits, 
12 then the decision to grant the award should not be 
13 second-guessed. In other words, the business judgment 
14 rule applies because you got meaningful limits baked 
15 into the 2015 plan. 
16 THE COURT: The limit here for outside 
17 directors is like over $4 million per director? 
18 MR. JORDAK: Well, that would assume 
19 that you're calculating the number based on how the 
20 plaintiffs did in their papers. That assumes that you 
21 multiply -- assumes that all the options vested on the 
22 date that they were ratified at that price of $22. Of 
23 course, they vest over a three-year period and haven't 
24 been in the money for some time. So that's how the 
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1 plaintiffs come up with that number. 
2 THE COURT: Let me ask it differently. 
3 Under the 2015 plan, is there a per-director limit? 
4 MR. JORDAK: There is. 200,000 
5 shares. 
THE COURT: And at the time the plan 6 
7 was adopted -- is that for RSUs, options, both? What 
8 is that for? 
9 






I believe that's just for 
Well --
I don't believe it's for 
13 RSUs or SARs, but I would have to double-check that. 
14 The other meaningful limit is a share 
15 cap of 3.6 million under the plan, three-year minimum 
16 vesting requirement, and, of course, that the price, 
17 exercise price, is equal to or greater than the fair 
18 market value on the grant date. 
19 The plaintiffs cite cases that, again, 
20 have wildly different factual allegations: the Calma 
21 case, which is an RSU case, where Your Honor found 
22 that there was no ceiling on what could be awarded, 
23 and the Seinfeld case, where each director could 
24 receive up to $20 million. And we would argue that 
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1 those are different situations than what we've had 
2 here that; that in those cases, there really was no 
3 meaningful limit. 
4 
5 report. 
The plaintiffs also refer to this Cook 
We spent some time in our brief explaining 
6 how they just basically cherry-picked the portions of 
7 that that they liked. They didn't give a full 
8 reasoning for why the Cook report really is not 
9 applicable here. It's really an apples and oranges 
10 comparison. 
11 The complaint does make some 




further. I don't think they're claiming that the RSUs 
were spring-loaded. You really can't spring-load 
RSUs. So we would argue that the reference to the 
16 spring-loading is irrelevant here. 
17 And then, finally, Your Honor, for the 
18 two remaining claims, there's a proxy disclosure claim 
19 and an unjust enrichment claim. 
20 






Before you go there, let 
Sure. 
The grants that the 
24 compensation committee made to the officers, not the 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
1 other directors, they were also on March 30th. 
2 that right? 
3 MR. JORDAK: Yes, Your Honor. 
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Is 





were they -- I think the answer is no but I just want 
to be sure. Were they discussed in the context of 
seeking shareholder approval of the 2015 plan? 
MR. JORDAK: I believe they were. 
9 THE COURT: And similar to what it 
10 said about the directors, did the proxy state that if 
11 you didn't approve the plan, the officers wouldn't 
12 get -- I guess, just logically, that had to happen 
13 insofar as the officers received grants under the 2015 
14 plan. 
15 Some were also under the 2011 plan. 
16 Right? 
17 MR . JORDAK: That's correct. The ones 
18 that vested immediately were under the 2011 plan. 
19 THE COURT: My inference is that they 





MR. JORDAK: They did. 
THE COURT: Needed something to work 
So, I'm sorry, in terms of the 









question I had, though --
MR. JORDAK: Yeah. I'm looking here 
now at the proxy. 
THE COURT: Where are you looking, 
just so I can try to find it? 
MR. JORDAK: Page 11. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let me see the 
8 proxy here. 
9 MR. JORDAK: And I believe what 
10 they've done there is they've listed out the -- no, 
11 
12 
they do list them individually. 
THE COURT: All right. I see -- yeah, 











MR. JORDAK: And then they've got all 
executive nondirectors as a group. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. JORDAK: Which is 170,000. 
THE COURT: Just bear with me a 
second. 
MR. JORDAK: Sure. 
THE COURT: Can you show me what part 
23 of the proxy indicates that each outside director is 
24 getting 20,000 except for one person who I think was 
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1 70, 000? 
2 MR. JORDAK: I'm not able to put my 
3 finger on that right now. 
4 THE COURT: All right. Maybe you and 
5 your colleagues can look for that while Mr. Purcell is 
6 making argument. 
7 MR. JORDAK: Okay. Let me just finish 






Again, the two remaining 
11 claims are the disclosure claim and the unjust 
12 enrichment claim. 






I think the plaintiffs do not dispute what was 
actually disclosed in the proxy. They're only 
claiming that we failed to disclose that we breached 
our fiduciary duties by failing to disclose that we 
spring-loaded the options. So, in essence, they're 
19 accusing us of failing to engage in self-flagellation. 
20 And we have cited several cases in our papers that we 
21 are under no obligation to do that. 
22 
23 cite Weiss. 
And again, they cite Tyson II. They 
But in those cases, the Court held that 
24 the defendants, in fact, did spring-load the options 
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1 at issue. 
2 And then for the unjust enrichment 
3 claim, again, if the breach of fiduciary duty claim 
4 falls, which we submit that it should, then the unjust 













MR . PURCELL: 
All right. Thank you. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Mr. Purcell. 
Good afternoon, Your 
Good afternoon. 
As defense counsel 
13 indicated, the defendants have made two primary 
14 arguments in an attempt to dismiss the plaintiffs' 
15 claims, one of which is ratification, and the other 
16 argument is an alleged failure to sufficiently allege 
17 a spring-loading scheme under Tyson and its progeny. 
18 Now, with respect to ratification, I 
19 was looking over the briefs in preparation for the 
20 hearing. I was reminded of my initial reaction to 
21 their motion to dismiss, which was uncertainty as to 
22 whether or not the defendants were actually making any 
23 ratification defense at all. 
24 Of course, ratification is an 
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1 affirmative defense that the defendants have the 
2 burden of establishing. And in Your Honor's Citrix 
3 discussion, in that case, it was clear that the 
4 defendants had failed to establish that defense for 
5 reasons that I think apply a fortiori here, and I will 
6 get to that. 
7 But in their opening brief, they 
8 actually really don't have any argument about 
9 ratification, per se. The term I believe shows up a 
10 couple of times but in the context of quotations from 
11 cases. What they say is that the shareholders 
12 approved this, and they approved it when they approved 
13 the plan because we disclosed it. 
14 And in addressing their arguments, we 
15 wanted to be sure that to the extent they were making 
16 a ratification defense, we were going to show why that 
17 defense did not apply and they hadn't carried their 





And then on reply, it's front and 
They have eight pages on it, and they cite 
all of the cases. I think in their opening brief, 
22 they don't cite the Calma or the Citrix case until 
23 almost the last page of their brief and only with 
24 respect to an argument about the relationship between 
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1 an unjust enrichment claim and a breach of fiduciary 
2 duty claim in this context. 
3 In any event, I think, based on Your 
4 Honor's very thorough historical discussion of the 
5 ratification concept, particularly as it applies in 
6 the context of these shareholder-approved compensation 
7 plans, that there's absolutely no way there was 
8 ratification here. 
9 And if you go back to the proxy, 
10 counsel wants to rely, I think, exclusively on the 
11 language in the proxy which is in their brief and Your 
12 Honor said you had read it carefully. The word 
13 "ratify" is only used in the proxy for something that 
14 has nothing to do with any of this, which is the 
15 public accountants. 
16 There were three votes that were in 
17 the 2015 proxy, and one was for the election of 
18 directors, another was for approval of this 2015 plan, 
19 and the third was ratification of the public 
20 accountants. Ratification -- not that this would 
21 necessarily be dispositive, but ratification does not 
22 appear at all when discussing the 2015 plan. What 
23 they say is that the grants that were made under this 
24 2015 plan were contingent on shareholder approval of 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
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2 I think there is a very important 
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3 distinction to be made here, and it ties into concepts 
4 that were discussed in Your Honor's Citrix opinion. I 
5 think there's a major fundamental difference between 
6 asking shareholders to approve something and telling 
7 them the board's position as to the consequence of 
8 approving something. 
9 They never asked shareholders to 
10 approve these awards. And what they told 
11 shareholders, I think as Your Honor alluded to 
12 rightly, was somewhat of a tautology because they say 




nullity. Well, of course they are. They issued them 
under the 2015 plan and they asked shareholders to 
vote on it. At no point did they ever ask 
17 shareholders to ratify these awards, and no such vote 
18 ever occurred. 
19 And it is not enough under the case 
20 law that all of the information relating to the grants 
21 was in the proxy, even if it was. I actually don't 
22 think all of the information as it relates to the 
23 nonemployee directors specifically is in the proxy. I 
24 believe that the only explanation as to what those 
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1 awards were for is in the Form 4 filings, which 
2 indicate that these were awards related to board and 
3 committee service. 
4 In any event, even if they fully 
5 disclosed everything about the options that were 
6 granted to each specific individual, there is not a 
7 ratification here. 
8 As Your Honor noted in the Cambridge 
9 or the Bosnjak case, that decision does not 
10 specifically address whether or not two separate votes 
11 would necessarily be required in a context that's 
12 similar to this, but in finding that the awards that 
13 were attacked by the plaintiffs in that case were in 
14 fact ratified, Your Honor noted in the opinion that 
15 the awards were set forth in separate proposals for 
16 the individuals in question and the shareholders voted 
17 as to each separate proposal. There was no bundling 
18 or tying together of a plan or a plan amendment with 
19 awards that were granted underneath them, I think. 
20 
21 this reason: 
It's a fundamental distinction for 
There's actually more than one action 
22 taking place with respect to the 2015 plan and the 
23 awards that the board made under it. It's not just 
24 one thing. 
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1 And I think the distinction that was 
2 discussed I believe initially in the 3Com case and 
3 then in Your Honor's opinion in some other cases as 
4 well was the distinction between awards that more or 
5 less accrue to individuals in a self-enforcing way 
6 under a plan that stockholders approved versus an 
7 independent and unilateral decision of a board to 
8 grant awards underneath a general compensation plan. 
9 And this is not a situation and the 
10 defendants have really not even made the argument that 
11 this was an accrual of awards to defendants in a 
12 self-enforcing way under a plan that was approved. 
13 There's two separate things. There is 
14 adoption of the plan, which they asked shareholders to 
15 approve, and then there is the awards that the board 
16 decided to grant under this new plan. 
17 And I think that the issue as to why 
18 the board made those grants at the time that they did 
19 is significant but it's not significant for 
20 ratification purposes. It's really significant to the 
21 second part of our case, which is the spring-loading 
22 part of the case. 
23 And Your Honor had asked Mr. Jordak 
24 about the interrelationship between the arguments they 
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1 have made in their briefs, the Tyson arguments, versus 
2 the ratification arguments. And, you know, I had, as 
3 I indicated, a question about this when I first saw 
4 their motion because it wasn't clear they were making 
5 a ratification defense. 
6 And I think, as counsel conceded, in 
7 his view, that if the ratification defense fails, this 
8 is an entire fairness case. And at the motion to 
9 dismiss stage, to say the least, the defendants are 
10 really going to be going uphill because --
11 technically, this is spring, although you wouldn't 
12 know it from the weather outside. To use a baseball 
13 analogy, the defendants were doing their best to get 
14 the business judgment rule on the mound because when a 
15 stockholder plaintiff steps into the box against the 
16 business judgment rule on a motion to dismiss, he's 
17 going to hit for a low average at best, whereas if it 
18 is entire fairness in that same context, it's exactly 
19 the opposite. The plaintiff is going to be in good 
20 shape in terms of what he needs to plead to survive 
21 the motion. 
22 THE COURT: So let me break this down 
23 a little bit. 
24 Let's focus on the decision to grant 
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1 the options to the officer defendants, which I 
2 understand there are five of them. One is a director. 





Obviously, the scope of consideration, or the 
magnitude is a better word, of consideration to them 
is very different than for outside directors. Put the 
spring-loading concept to the side for a moment. Are 
8 you arguing, independent of that, that that 









That the compensation to 
Officer directors. 
-- the so-called 
15 recipient defendants --
16 THE COURT: Well, I think the 
17 recipient defendants, at least as the defendants have 
18 defined it, includes some directors too. 
19 
20 
21 five officers. 
22 
MR. PURCELL: Yeah. 
THE COURT: I'm just focusing on the 
MR. PURCELL: No. What we allege with 
23 respect to those defendants is that they were granted 
2 4 stock opt ions that were spr ing-1 oaded, in other words, 
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1 that were manipulated in a manner that was designed to 
2 shortchange the company and benefit the recipients 





THE COURT: Okay. So let me ask you a 
question about it. Let's assume, you know, you 
haven't stated a claim for spring-loading, just 
hypothetically. Why wouldn't the decision of the 
8 compensation committee in approving the compensation 
9 for the officers, just the officers now, be classic 
10 business judgment? Board members are deciding what 
11 the compensation of the management of the company 
12 should be. 
13 MR. PURCELL: Your Honor, I think the 
14 answer to that lies in the quid pro quo concept that 
15 is discussed not in any of our briefs, because it did 
16 not appear to me to be an issue. But in this 
17 situation, the plaintiffs' position would be that 
18 because you have a large irregular grant of stock 
19 options that we submit for various reasons was made 
20 at, at the very least, a highly suspicious point in 
21 time, and the options were granted not only to the 
22 directors themselves, and we include the CEO in that 
23 equation, but to the highest level of management at 
2 4 the company, and 






What's the quid pro quo? 
Well, the directors get 
3 their extra options because they had already been 




THE COURT: Right. Why did they need 
management's help to do that? They just could do it. 
MR. PURCELL: Well, Your Honor, they 
8 would need information from management as to what was 






Well, in order to time 
12 the options as part of the spring-loading scheme. 
13 THE COURT: That's getting into your 
14 spring-loading theory, if you think there is a 
15 manipulation, which, obviously, you do. But like I 
16 said, just put spring-loading aside. 
17 MR. PURCELL: Yes. You're absolutely 
18 correct. Putting that aside, because the whole 
19 theory, which, again, wasn't briefed because it didn't 
20 appear to be an issue, but Your Honor is absolutely 
21 correct that if you put that entirely to one side, 
22 then there would be no separate issue as to that. 
23 THE COURT: Right. So just to be real 
24 clear on this, so if I put spring-loading to the side 
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1 and I'm looking at the officer grants that the company 
2 made, that's business judgment, isn't it? 
3 
4 
5 about -- again, 
MR. PURCELL: Correct. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, talk to me 
put spring-loading aside and let's 
6 talk about the three directors who weren't on the comp 
7 
8 
committee. Tell me your theory there. 
MR. PURCELL: Your Honor, I think 






Under the same reasoning 






THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. PURCELL: Now, moving on to the 
Tyson arguments 
THE COURT: Before you do that, let me 
just -- I think I have one more question here. Let me 
18 just see if I can figure out what it was. 
19 Well, go ahead. I can follow up in 
20 the context of your spring-loading argument. 
21 MR. PURCELL: Okay. Moving on to the 
22 Tyson arguments that the defendants have made, I think 
23 that it is critical to keep in mind that this is a 
24 12 (b) (6) motion, which sort of gets at your previous 
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1 question, because there is no demand futility argument 
2 that has been made, so we're not doing a 23.1 
3 analysis, which, of course, is a much higher bar than 
4 12(b)(6). 
5 Under 12(b) (6), we're talking about 
6 whether or not the plaintiffs' well-pled allegations 
7 have stated a cognizable claim of a recoverable injury 
8 under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances 
9 that are susceptible to proof, based on what the 
10 plaintiff has alleged. 
11 And the case law that the defendants 
12 rely on is primarily I think Desimone, which is 
13 distinguishable for a number of reasons that we 
14 discussed in our brief, but it's applying the 23.1 
15 standard to a 12(b)(6) motion. So it's attempting to 
16 change the lens through which Your Honor will view 
17 these allegations. And we've explained in our brief 
18 why we think that's inappropriate. 
19 Aside from that but related to it is 




of things that aren't in the complaint. And their 
goal in doing that is to try to 
very frank about this intention 
and I think they're 
they're trying to 
24 undercut the strength of inference that flows 
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1 otherwise from plaintiffs' well-pled allegations that 
2 spring-loading occurred. And they do that by pointing 
3 to historical stock option grants, purported 
4 volatility of the company's stock, and the like. 
5 What struck me when I saw those 
6 arguments is how similar they are to Tyson and Weiss, 
7 where those same arguments were made and they were 
8 
9 
rejected. On a 12(b) (6), it's inappropriate for the 
Court to decide those sorts of factual matters. The 
10 plaintiff is the master of his own complaint. 
11 I think on the well-pled allegations 
12 of this particular complaint, we have alleged 
13 sufficiently for 12 (b) (6) purposes a spring-loading 
14 scheme. 
15 And with respect to that, the 
16 defendants have said we have nothing but conclusions 
17 in our complaint. It's absolutely not true. I mean, 
18 we have very specific allegations about who these 
19 people are because that's very important, who the 
20 
21 
people are. This is not a case where you have a huge 
grant of stock options to low-level employees. These 
22 are the directors and the most senior people that are 
23 running the company on a day-to-day basis. 
24 The other thing is the nature of the 




information. That's also important. And the reason 
it's important is because when you combine who the 
3 people are, what the information is about, it 
4 determines the reasonableness of the inference that 
5 flows from the allegations in terms of whether or not 
6 it's reasonably conceivable on these set of facts that 
7 the board engaged in spring-loading. 
8 And we described the three disclosures 





Again, directors had already been paid for 
We described those press releases and we quote 
12 defendants the language they used at the time, that 
13 this is a significant milestone. This is a pivotal 
14 study. 
15 And then there was some positive 
16 and that's within a week. Those first two 
17 announcements are within a week of the stock grant. 
18 And the other one is a couple of weeks later, but it 
19 was at a conference where one of the defendants 
20 presented some very positive data about, again, one of 
21 the company's three most significant products. This 
22 is what they do. These products are the most 
23 important to them as a company. 
24 And the thing that defendants entirely 
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1 left out, at least in the oral argument today, is the 




this whole process. And this was central to the 
plaintiffs' allegations because it's part of the story 
that has been told in the complaint. And to the 
6 extent we've made well-pleaded allegations, those must 
7 be accepted as true on 12(b) (6). 
8 You look at this offering which 
9 occurred at the end of April, about a month after this 
10 
11 
unusual grant of stock options. The options were made 
when the stock was $13.44. By the time you get to the 
12 end of the period where they have made these 
13 announcements, you have a 64 percent increase because 
14 they've released all this good news in the interim. 
15 
16 
THE COURT: So let me just be a little 
more precise about it. I saw the 64 percent. So 
17 you're telling my that by April 21st, which is the 
18 date of the third announcement, the price was up 
19 64 percent over what it was on March 30th? 
20 MR. PURCELL: If we got our 
21 calculation right, it is. 
22 THE COURT: That's like me telling you 
23 I'm a billionaire if I added up my bank account 
24 correctly. 
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1 MR. PURCELL: Independently, at this 
2 time, I don't know that, but we did look at it and 
3 make that calculation and I stand by it. I don't 
4 believe it's wrong, but the way Your Honor asked the 
5 
6 
question, I just wanted to be careful. 
THE COURT: Okay. So would the 
7 following be correct, which is, your complaint doesn't 
8 allege facts that the compensation committee members 
9 knew as of March 30th of the events that were the 
10 specific subjects of the press releases on April 6th, 
11 8th and 21st, but you're asking me to infer from their 
12 proximity to March 30th that they must have known. 
13 Is that a fair characterization or 





MR. PURCELL: Sorry, Your Honor. 
Could I get that again? Because I want to make sure. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
There are not facts in the complaint 
19 that the directors who were on the compensation 
20 committee and made the awards on March 30th actually 
21 knew -- you don't have facts that they actually knew 
22 on March 30th of any of the events in the April 6th, 
23 
24 
8th, or 21st press releases. Is that right? 
MR. PURCELL: We do not -- we allege 
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1 that as a conclusion that is based on a different set 
2 of facts, but we do not allege that they knew and I 
3 don't think we have to allege at this point that they 
4 knew . We certainly don't have to show that they knew. 
5 Under 12 (b) (6), what we need to do is 
6 offer a set of allegations that, accepted as true, 
7 satisfies Rule 12 (b) (6). And I think that we have 
8 done that. 
9 
10 
THE COURT: Okay. Summarize, though, 
in a nutshell what those allegations are. I presume 
11 you're including in that the fact that, you know, they 
12 previously had received this. The calendar year or 








MR. PURCELL: Yes, or November 1st. 
THE COURT: And they had already 
received sort of a set of grants for the prior fiscal 
year . Now it's only five months later, and they're 
getting another slug of awards. That's one fact. 
MR. PURCELL: Right. 
THE COURT: Another fact, I guess, 
21 would be the closeness in time between March 30th and 
22 the dates the amounts, and it's in the inference 
23 you would draw from that. 
24 MR. PURCELL: Right. And they had a 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
51 
1 director compensation policy that they disclosed that 
2 clearly says that the directors get their compensation 
3 at the beginning of the fiscal year. And it's 
4 $100,000 annually, I think it says at least 50 percent 
5 
6 
of which needs to consist of equity. 
THE COURT: I want you to show me that 
7 in a minute, but just finish the list of your facts 
8 that you think, in a nutshell, support you meeting the 
9 12 (b) (6) standard that they had material inside 







MR. PURCELL: Sure. I want to 
actually start with what I was talking about a couple 
minutes ago, which is the public offering. The 
company had disclosed no later than January that they 
were going to need to raise financing in order to 
continue operations. And I think it's a reasonable 
17 inference that, based on that disclosure and based on 
18 the nature of the financing and all of its meetings 
19 that companies have to have with bankers about what's 
20 going on at the company, that there were going to be 
21 discussions about the timing of not only the offering 
22 but anything that's going on in the meantime, 
23 including all of positive news that was released in 
24 April, which, in fact, is described in the prospectus 
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1 supplement through which they offered the shares. 
2 But, actually, at least equally important, there is 
3 the fact that when they sat down to do this, they 
4 recognized they didn't have enough capacity under the 
5 2011 plan so they adopted a new plan, the 2015 plan. 
6 And rather than wait until the 
7 shareholder meeting, which was coming up soon -- I 
8 think it was imminent at that point in time -- they 
9 went ahead and granted these awards and made them 
10 contingent on stockholder approval. There's been no 
11 explanation in the company's filings or in any of the 
12 defendants' briefing as to why they did not simply 
13 wait until after the annual meeting occurred and the 
14 shareholders had approved the plan. 
15 We have alleged in our complaint that 
16 they didn't wait because they wanted to spring-load 
17 the options. And when you combine that, again, with 
18 who the people are, the nature of the disclosures -- I 
19 think there was a 10-Q or a 10-K that actually 
20 described these three products as the company's 
21 leading product candidates. So these were the things 
22 that the people running the company were focused on in 
23 their day-to-day business. 
24 With respect to the role of the 
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1 compensation committee in compensating the executive 
2 officers through these grants and otherwise, the 
3 status of these products, the three most important 
4 ones to the company, was obviously going to be a 
5 critical factor. 
6 In addition, many of these defendants 
7 are quoted in the press release. The defendants have 











this is just chest-thumping puffery. Well, look at 
what they've said. And of course that's how they want 
to characterize it now. But they spoke in highly 
favorable terms about all this stuff and the stock 
price went up a lot. And a number of these other 
defendants were on the research and development 
committee responsible for monitoring scientific 
developments at the company and informing the board 
about it. 
So I think when you combine all of 
19 that, it's clear that under the law, in particular, 
20 most recently in the Sanchez opinion from the Supreme 
21 Court, you look at the facts that have been alleged on 
22 a holistic basis. We're not looking at these things 
23 one by one, as the defendants try to do in their 
24 brief, and try to dismiss them, because there is a 





narrative. There's a narrative that's been told 
through well-pled allegations. And the question is, 
is it enough? Is it heavy enough? And I think on a 
4 12 (b) (6) motion, it absolutely is. 
5 
6 moment ago, 
THE COURT: All right. So as I said a 
I wanted you to show me this compensation 
7 policy manual, whatever it is you were referring to, 
8 that has the 100,000 amount. Because you're making it 
9 sound like it's a 100,000 cap. I thought there was 
10 some debate about that. So if you can just show me 
11 where that language is . 
12 MR. PURCELL: Yeah. Let me see. I 
13 want to -- actually, let me clarify what the 
14 
15 
allegation is. It won't necessarily moot Your Honor's 
question. I want to try to answer anyway, but I want 
16 to try to clarify what the allegation is. 
17 
18 
19 a cap. 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PURCELL: It is not that there was 
The point is that the policy indicated that 
20 the directors were going to get an annual award of 
21 compensation at the beginning of the fiscal year, and 
22 that's what happened. And so when you have, a few 
23 months after that, a situation where, all of a sudden, 
24 they're getting all these extra awards, they're 
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1 getting options, they're getting RSUs, as a 
2 shareholder, you're not holding up a policy and trying 




this to say it was once a year and it was a cap and 
you violated it. That's not the point. 
The point is that the fact that they 
7 already got paid for that fiscal year under their 
8 policy, coupled with the timing of the grant and the 




the suspect nature of the overall grant. So it's just 
another item. We're not trying to enforce any 
specific policy. We're not contending that it 




THE COURT: So where is it? 
MR. PURCELL: Let me see. 
THE COURT: So I saw it quoted in the 




MR. PURCELL: The company's proxy 
20 statement filed on April 30, 2013. 
21 THE COURT: Which exhibit? 
22 MR. PURCELL: Actually, I don't know 
23 that I have -- Exhibit G, and this is paragraph 51 of 
24 the complaint. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Do you know where 
2 in G it is? 
3 MR. PURCELL: I don't, offhand. I'm 




It is on page 38. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
So, now, I don't know what point you 





my mind. Let's assume I guess I want to know this 
both ways. Let's take it this way first. 
Let's assume you got enough to get by 
12(b) (6) on your spring-loading claim. It's one thing 




committee that made these decisions. Right? Why do 
the recipients stay in, even if you're right about 
that? And now I'm referring to the three directors 
17 who weren't on the comp committee as well as the five 
18 officers. 
19 MR. PURCELL: Your Honor, I think that 
20 the reason that they would stay in at this point is 
21 that the same allegations that go to establishing a 
22 basis for reasonable inference under 12 (b) (6) as to 
23 the compensation committee defendants applies to them 
24 as well. Admittedly, not to the same degree. But the 
CHANCERY COURT REPORTERS 
57 
1 distinction I want to draw is between a company's CFO 
2 or, you know, CEO, and some low-level -- even take 
3 someone in the mailroom or even a lower-level vice 
4 president of the company. I think there is a major 
5 difference in terms of the role that person has at the 
6 company and their relationship with the board of 
7 directors, their responsibilities at the company, how 
8 they're going to be compensated, and so on. 
9 I think because, here, while everyone 
10 did not grant the award because that was the 




people at the company. And I think the allegations 
that have been made apply to them all generally. 
And in the complaint, I know that 
15 there are specific allegations as to probably most of 
16 these individuals. I believe that Khleif was someone 
17 that made a presentation at the Cancer Society 
18 meeting. Petit is quoted in a press release. And, 
19 again, the other people have very significant titles. 
20 And I think it's fair to infer that their role at the 
21 company was such that the allegations applied to --
22 
23 differently. 
THE COURT: So let me try it a little 
I mean, I get the point that you could 
24 infer them to have the same knowledge as members of 
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1 the comp committee and, indeed, with respect to the 
2 officer defendants, presumably, a stronger inference 
3 could be made since they managed the company, but I'm 
4 asking somewhat of a different point. And let me tie 
5 it to asking whether you have any authority. 




be the decision-maker. You're on the line for that. 
You sort of have to own that. It's another thing to 
receive something. Is there some authority that you 
10 can point me to that, just by receiving it, if you 
11 know it was spring-loaded, that's enough? 
12 MR. PURCELL: Yes, Your Honor. I 
13 would point to both Tyson and Weiss, potentially Ryan 
14 v. Gifford and Conrad v. Blank, all of which, I think, 
15 support the basic proposition that to the extent a 
16 plaintiff has adequately alleged that a recipient of 
17 an award was manipulated with respect to its timing, 
18 whether it's backdating or spring-loading, to the 
19 extent the plaintiff has put forth allegations that 
20 are sufficient to establish, again, while it's all 
21 accepted as true in the complaint, that the person had 
22 a reason to know that the options had been 
23 manipulated, then that person stays in the case. 
24 THE COURT: Is that as a matter of a 
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1 breach of fiduciary duty claim, unjust enrichment 
2 claim? 
MR. PURCELL: I think it's both. 
THE COURT: All right. Okay. 





6 finish with we've been going for some time -- is 
7 the concept --
8 
9 last question. 
10 
11 
THE COURT: One more variation on that 
MR. PURCELL: Sure. 
THE COURT: I know I'm hitting you 
12 with a lot of hypotheticals but, fortunately, I'm 
13 allowed to do that. 
14 So let's assume spring-loading doesn't 
15 get by 12(b) (6) for this question, but you've got a 
16 fairness claim as to the comp committee's approval of 
17 their own options on the theory that it wasn't 
18 ratified. 
Again, I get why the three comp 19 
20 committee members stay in. How about the other comp 
21 committee members who didn't make that decision? 
22 MR. PURCELL: I think to the extent 
23 the spring-loading claim is gone entirely, and as I 
24 conceded earlier in response to your question, there 
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1 is no freestanding allegation of excess compensation, 
2 that those claims fall away. 
3 THE COURT: Actually, I thought you 
4 were challenging their compensation for like being 650 
5 grand or something. 
MR. PURCELL: Well, I'm sorry. I'm 6 
7 talking about anyone that's not a director. So I 
8 misunderstood the question. 
9 THE COURT: I'm focusing on the three 
10 noncomp committee directors. 
11 MR. PURCELL: I'm sorry. For the 
12 directors, I think we have an entire fairness claim 
13 based on the amount, based on the overall amount. 
14 that is a claim that is based on the fact that the 
15 average director was paid, I think, approximately 
16 $650,000 for fiscal year 2015. And I think we've 
17 sufficiently alleged that there are, at the very 
And 
18 least, reasonable questions as to whether or not that 
19 compensation is entirely fair. 
20 
21 
Because the peer group -- this is a 
small company, $540 million in market cap. We have 
22 made allegations based on a compensation study that 
23 indicates that, you know, the peers in the 50th 
24 percentile were around I think 133,000. And even if 
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1 you go to the 75th percentile, we're talking about 
2 175,000, maybe. So, here, the overall level of comp 
3 is just so far off the charts that I think we have an 
4 excess comp claim as to the entire board. 
5 THE COURT: Even if you do, even if 
6 you have an excess -- or even if you have an entire 
7 fairness claim as to the directors' compensation, I 
8 guess I'm trying to understand why that claim has legs 
9 to the three noncompensation committee members who, 
10 admittedly, are the recipients of it, but they didn't 
11 make the decision to grant it. That's what I was 
12 focusing on. 
13 MR. PURCELL: Yeah. Your Honor, in 
14 thinking about this now, the breach of fiduciary duty 
15 claim, if it existed, would have to rely on the 
16 proposition that it was a breach of fiduciary duty 
17 simply to be the acceptor of an excess compensation 
18 package. 
19 I think as to unjust enrichment, as I 
20 understand the elements of that claim, those 
21 individuals would stay in the case, because the test 
22 is whether or not they have realized a benefit that, 
23 in equity and good conscience, is unfair and should 
24 essentially be disgorged. So I think as to the unjust 
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1 enrichment claim, those individuals would still be in 





THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PURCELL: The last point I was 
going to discuss was the concept of meaningful limits 
in the plan. And this is, again, something that in 
7 defendants' opening brief, they weren't as specific as 
8 they became on reply. 
9 We went through the Seinfeld v. Slager 
10 type analysis as to whether or not there are 
11 meaningful director limits in the plan and computed 
12 the sums to be, I think, for an overall limit, 
13 81 million, for overall individual limit, 61 million. 
14 And then there was a provision that the defendants did 
15 not appear to be relying on, which I think is Section 
16 5.4 of the plan, that does set a limit for directors 
17 of 200,000 shares. And I assume that they weren't 
18 relying on that because if that's the best number they 
19 can come up with, it's fairly ridiculous to 
20 characterize that as a meaningful limit because the 
21 amount of money we're talking about is $4.5 million. 
22 I think under the case law, that is in 
23 
24 
no way a meaningful limit. A vesting requirement is 
not a meaningful limit. The fair market v alue 
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THE COURT: I'm sorry. You probably 
just said this and I was distracted for a second. 




is calculated how? 
MR. PURCELL: Taking those 200,000 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. PURCELL: So calculating the 
So 
9 per-share value times 200,000, as of the time we filed 
10 
11 
the complaint. I believe it was --
THE COURT: Well, how did you 
12 calculate the per-share value? 
13 
14 





17 trading at at the time. 
18 THE COURT: 
Multiplying. 
What was the per-share 
Whatever the stock was 
So you were assuming these 
19 were outright grants of shares, not options or 
20 something like that. 
21 MR. PURCELL: In fact, Your Honor, I 
22 believe that the plan has a vesting requirement that 
23 doesn't apply to the directors. So under the plan, I 
24 think the directors could get options or could get an 
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understand your calculation. 
I was just trying to 
I mean, the case is 
64 
5 discussing options, and so I'm just trying to make 
6 sense of what this $4.5 million means that's in the 
7 plan. 
8 I can go read it and figure it out, 
9 but if you'd explain it to me, it would be easier. 
10 MR. PURCELL: I think we took the 
11 200,000 shares, which is --
12 THE COURT: And you just multiplied it 




MR. PURCELL: Right. 
And, again, I think under the case 
17 law, that in no way, shape, or form is a meaningful 
18 limit such that it could be said that shareholders 
19 have said in approving the plan that it's perfectly 
20 fine for the directors to pay themselves up to that 
21 amount. 
22 And if Your Honor has no further 
23 questions --
24 THE COURT: I just have one. So 









nobody has really addressed and I guess I want to know 
what your position is on Count III. 
disclosure-related claim. 
I guess it's the 
MR. PURCELL: The disclosure claim. 
THE COURT: Yeah. What is the nub of 
your claim and why do you think it survives? 
MR. PURCELL: The nub of the 
8 disclosure claim is that the 2015 proxy was false and 
9 misleading, not because, as the defendants say, it 
10 failed to include self-flagellating disclosures but 
11 because it did not disclose anything about the 
12 reason -- honing in on the specific reason why the 
13 board decided to make grants under a new plan that had 
14 not yet been approved by shareholders contingent on 
15 shareholder approval. 
16 In other words, why was it so 
17 important that the awards be granted with an exercise 
18 price as of March 30th and made contingent on 
19 shareholder approval, thus tying the two together, as 
20 opposed to simply waiting until after the shareholder 
21 meeting occurred and there had been a vote. 
22 And so it really does, of course, 
23 relate directly to the spring-loading allegations. 
24 But the plaintiffs' position, of course, is not that 
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1 the defendants needed to include a disclosure that 
2 said "spring-loading," but the point is that there is, 








THE COURT: All right. 
MR. PURCELL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jordak, we're going to 
take a short break and I'll come back. It will be 
pretty brief. But, that way, you won't be interrupted 




MR. JORDAK: Thank you, sir. 
(A brief recess was taken.) 
MR. JORDAK: Your Honor, I have just a 
14 few points that I'd like to make. 
15 First, I think, as we've said in our 
16 papers, we acknowledge that we are relying in part on 
17 decisions that were analyzed under 23.1. There is a 
18 very limited body of case law for spring-loading 
19 cases, and we've tried to look at all of them. 
20 In particular, we believe that the 
21 Desimone case most clearly is similar to what we've 
22 
23 
got here. It was analyzed under 23.1, although part 
of it was under 12(b) (6). In any event, we do feel 
24 like it gives a very good legal framework for how to 
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1 analyze a stock option case. 
2 And I would like to read one quote 
3 from the Desimone case which was not in our brief but 
4 I noticed it as I was reading through the case again 
5 last night. I think that it's a good quote. 
6 "Lumping context-specific behavior 
7 involving various motivations into generic categories 
8 such as spring loading 
. . . ' and driving results by 
9 such labeling, seems unlikely to do justice." 
10 
11 Your Honor. 
And then, finally, one other point, 
We talked a little bit about whether 
12 entire fairness applies if there's been no 
13 ratification. And that would clearly just be with 




That's all. Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And what says that? 
MR. JORDAK: It's their decision that 
18 was being ratified by the stockholders. 
THE COURT: Well, what if, ultimately, 19 
20 those payments were shown to be unfair? Can there be 
21 a recovery from the three noncomp committee directors 
22 of the delta of unfairness? 
23 MR. JORDAK: I'm not sure about that, 
24 Your Honor. 








Okay. Thank you. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Mr. Purcell, do you have 
4 anything else? 
5 MR. PURCELL: Your Honor, if I could 
6 have 30 seconds or less, I believe. 
7 Going back to Desimone, I don't want 
8 to belabor the point because I think we adequately 
9 explained in our brief why we think it's 
10 distinguishable. I do want to respond to the one 
11 point that Mr. Jordak just made with respect to the 
12 portion of the case that was decided under 12 (b) (6). 
13 The one piece of that case that was 
14 decided under 12 (b) (6) concerned backdating, and it 
15 was dismissed because the plan at issue provided for 
16 awards to be issued on a specific date. The claim 
17 made absolutely no sense . And that is the type of 
18 claim that fails under 12 (b) (6), not the claim that's 
19 been alleged here. 
20 Thank you. 
21 
22 
23 were made. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
Well, thank you for the arguments that 
I am going to give you a partial ruling 
24 now and then take the balance of this motion under 
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1 advisement. But part of it is clear to me, and I 
2 think I'm in a position, therefore, to deal with it. 
3 This complaint contains three claims. 
4 Count I is a breach of fiduciary duty claim against 
5 all the defendants, Count II is an unjust enrichment 
6 claim against all the defendants, and Count III is a 
7 breach of fiduciary duty claim premised on a candor 
8 theory against just the director defendants. I say 
9 that just to set the stage. 
10 I am going to deny the motion to 
11 dismiss in part as to Counts I and II in the following 
12 sense, which is that it's clear to me that insofar as 
13 the decision of the compensation committee to approve 
14 compensation for themselves and their fellow directors 
15 is concerned, that that aspect of this complaint 
16 states a claim for relief . 
17 
18 follows: 
And the reason I say that is as 
I obviously spent a lot of time last year 
19 examining the ratification cases, specifically in the 
20 context of compensation matters. And what I gleaned 
21 from that survey of the law, and it's all hopefully 
22 spelled out in sufficiently clear language in the 
23 Calma decision, is that for a ratification defense to 
24 be effective, there must be ratification of a specific 
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1 decision. 
2 And what underlies that is the notion 
3 that there has to be a meeting of the minds, if you 
4 will, about what's actually being approved between, on 
5 the one hand, the company, in this case, the 
6 compensation committee acting on behalf of the 
7 company, in terms of what it's doing, and, on the 
8 other hand, the stockholders who were asked to vote on 
9 something. There's got to be sufficient specificity 
10 so there is not ambiguity that they're agreeing to the 
11 same thing, basically. 
12 
13 following way: 
Here, this vote was structured in the 
First, the compensation committee made 
14 a decision on March 30th of 2015 to grant themselves, 
15 which is presumptively a self-dealing transaction, and 
16 their fellow directors a certain number of options. I 
17 think it was 20,000 for that particular slug, with a 
18 three-year vesting period, but whatever the details 
19 are, they are. And in one case, I believe a director 
20 received 70,000 options. That's a presumptively 
21 self-dealing transaction, one that presumptively would 
22 be governed by entire fairness. 
23 If there had been a valid form of 
24 stockholder ratification, the standard of review would 
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1 have shifted back to business judgment for that 
2 decision. 
3 Here, though, what the proxy asks for 
4 stockholder approval of was stockholder approval of 
5 the plan and then contained some disclosure to the 
6 effect that grants that had been made to the directors 
7 and, for that matter, to anybody else for whom a grant 
8 had been made on shares that would have come from the 
9 new plan, would be nullified, in effect, if the plan 
10 wasn't approved. 
11 To me, that is not a situation where a 
12 specific approval was sought over the grants to the 
13 outside directors. There are lots of permutations you 
14 could read in from a vote from that. 






I presume it could mean one of three things. They 
were approving the plan. Maybe they're approving the 
grants that are enumerated under the plan. Maybe 
they're approving both. Not clear. 
The flip side is, and I think, 
21 frankly, the best reading is they're just approving 
22 the plan. The flip side is, as I think Mr. Jordak 
23 candidly acknowledged, if the stockholders had given a 
24 negative vote, it could mean one of at least three 
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1 things. They're disapproving the plan, they're 
2 disapproving the option, or they're disapproving both. 
3 The point is there's permutations. 
4 And where those permutations exist in that format, I 
5 don't think you have the sufficient meeting of the 
6 minds, the phrase I'm using here, to demonstrate 
7 approval of a specific decision of the compensation 
8 committee in this case. 
9 And for that reason, I don't think the 
10 ratification defense, based on the record that's 
11 before me, would provide a basis to shift the standard 
12 of review back to business judgment and that there is 
13 presumptively at this stage of the proceedings an 
14 entire fairness claim which survives the motion to 
15 dismiss. 
16 Relatedly, I will deny the motion 
17 insofar as Count II is concerned, the unjust 
18 enrichment claim, based on what I said in Calma, that 
19 such a claim would survive, recognizing, as a 
20 practical matter, it's probably entirely duplicative. 
21 And I'm only speaking of the unjust enrichment claim 
22 as it relates to the awarding of compensation of the 
23 outside directors. 
24 It may be entirely duplicative, and 







there is some case law suggesting when claims are 
duplicative, you can knock them out. And Calma cited 
a couple of cases indicating maybe the better part of 
valor is to keep them in. 
It probably doesn't matter much at end 
6 of the day, at least as far as the compensation 
7 committee members are concerned, but for the time 
8 being, I'm going to leave the claim in, as a matter of 
9 caution. 
10 I'm not providing any ruling at this 
11 time on I think essentially two things. Number one, 
12 I'm not providing any ruling on Count III because I've 






providing any ruling insofar as the spring-loading 
questions that have been discussed today are 
concerned. I need to also go back and think about 
that. 
Clearly, the three members of the 
19 compensation committee for purposes of this case will 
20 remain in the case based on what I've said. I need to 
21 think a little bit about the other three members of 
22 the compensation committee, both in the context of the 
23 spring-loading claim and in the context of the entire 
24 fairness issue that I've raised, depending on sort of 
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1 how the spring-loading claim works itself out. But 
2 those are questions that I still need to think through 




The consequence of this, of course, is 
that this case is moving forward. There is no stay of 
discovery. I won't grant a stay of discovery, and you 
7 ought to just presume to move forward and litigate 
8 your case. And I'll deal with the balance of the 


















Have a good day. 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
(Court adjourned at 3:43 p.m.) 
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